I will introduce now the first of two theoretical lectures. I don't know if we have to put the laptop here first. Are you going to do that? Okay, I just... yeah, okay, okay Throughout our curatory planning phase We soon came to realize that we want to emphasize The biggest nature of concepts such as knowledge, ignorance, non-knowledge and informedness. We want to avoid discussing ignorance exclusively as a means of seducing the public with malicious intent as well as portraying it as the innocent trait of a noble fool. Now I wanted to to read a paragraph about what I thought Lindsay would do yesterday but she talked about something different. So I'm coming right to our speaker today. I'm happy to welcome Sonja Rieger, whose extraordinary doctoral thesis on ignorance I was allowed to read earlier this year, and which also deals with the equivocal nature of ignorance. In her talk, she will give us an idea how, contrary to the pejorative connotation that we assign the absence of knowledge with, there are indeed powerful strategic applications of ignorance that can even benefit the resistance against oppression. Sonja Riegler held a position as a pre-doc at the University of Vienna until recently and creates radio shows on the topic of philosophical research. Welcome Sonja. Does this work? Do you hear me all right like this? Perfect. I think this is one of the nicest introductions I've ever gotten. Thank you so much. Thank you also for the invite. This is one of the first talks I give after having submitted my thesis, so this feels really special to me, also in front of this audience. Yeah, and yesterday, after the performances and after the great talk that Lindsay gave, I was thinking to myself, what can I actually add now? What else can I say? But I hope still nonetheless that I can tell you a bit about how philosophers think of ignorance, specifically epistemologists, so people who like to think about knowledge a lot, but also other epistemic phenomena. So I am what you could call an ignorance scholar, I guess. So in the last four years, I have thought about ignorance a lot, tried to become an expert on ignorance, which is kind of a paradox. And I work in philosophy, as I already said, specifically in feminist and political epistemology. And so my PhD thesis introduces a novel perspective on the study of ignorance. So I introduce a new account of ignorance, what I call a functionalist approach to ignorance. And so part of my argument in my thesis that I want to specifically talk about today is what I call, and this is something that Cynthia Townley actually coined as a term, ignorance-friendly epistemology. So I want to understand instances of ignorance that are not necessarily bad or harmful, but are actually an expectable feature of our epistemic life. And I think Matthias is going to talk a bit about that later. But what I want to focus on today is ignorance as a deliberate practice that can foster resistance. Maybe just another brief note, this is only part of my thesis, so I also have a big part on the intersection between ignorance and epistemic oppression. So I think we still should think of ignorance as something that can be quite harmful. But yeah, what I want to talk about today is the other side that can also be interesting and illuminating. So I want to... Do you hear me all right when I speak like this? I want to start with a quote, as philosophers like to do. But it's by a sociologist, and it's actually in your edited volume. It's by Michael Smithson. And he says, ignorance can be viewed as an absence or neglect of information, a failure to understand information, a mental state, a moral condition, a public problem, an economic commodity, a manufactured product, or an aspect of culture. And I think my account touches upon many of these aspects, but I also want to add something to this perspective, namely the question, can ignorance actually also be regarded as a legitimate refusal of inquiry or a justified refusal to share information. So what I want to do is, as I already said, an exercise in ignorance-friendly epistemology. So ignorance-friendly epistemology challenges the quite prevalent belief that gaining or sharing knowledge is always beneficial. And so questions an ignorance-friendly epistemologist could ask is, could a preference for ignorance sometimes be construed as legitimate, liberatory even? Is it sometimes justified to produce ignorance in others when our ascriptions of ignorance called for? And what are the epistemic and political benefits of ignorance? So don't worry, this is my only meme today. But I want to also specify that my focus is not on instances where somebody deliberately ignores a problem for their own psychological benefit. So my focus is not, for instance, on instances of climate change apathy or ignoring a dreaded telephone call ignoring a pending payment although the latter two are sometimes also legitimate and quite good I would say my focus specifically is on the epistemic and political relevance and the benefits of ignorance for so-called liberatory aims. And so my goals today are as follows. I want to trace instances where producing, ascribing, or maintaining ignorance is actually legitimate and called for. I also want to provide a systematization of liberatory forms of ignorance. And I want to show that sometimes we can transform the practice of ignorance for resisting aims, so for creating active and creative responses to forms of oppression. So obviously part of that goal is also thinking about a form of epistemic resistance, and it's not my goal today to define resistance or epistemic resistance. And it's not my goal today to define resistance or epistemic resistance in any way. I think this would be a talk in itself, probably a book in itself. And this book actually already kind of exists. It's by Jose Medina. It's a really cool read. I can recommend it if you're interested in forms of epistemic oppression and how to counteract them. So I'm going to work with a really broad conception of resistance today that is roughly inspired by Jose Medina's work. And I understand resistance as various kinds of interference that aim to dismantle predominant political systems, but also predominant knowledge systems. So how we think about knowledge, who can produce knowledge, for instance, who is a reliable source, who deserves credibility and who doesn't, and practices and norms of exclusion that sustain these systems. And I understand these systems to be interlocked, so epistemic and political systems are always, yeah, informing each other, influencing each other. So this is going to be my structure. I, as an academic, really sticking to, you know, structure. And I like these kinds of things where, you know, I tell people what I'm going to do and then actually do it. So I'm first going to give you a brief overview of scholarship on ignorance in both mainstream epistemology and feminist epistemology. I will then introduce my account of ignorance, so the functionalist approach, and show how it actually is situated in these divergent approaches, but what it can also add and amend to existing theorizing on ignorance specifically i'm going to focus on mechanisms and functions of ignorance and i'm then in the second part of my talk going to focus on ignorance and resistance or ignorance as resistance and provide a systematization give you a a few examples, and I'm going to then conclude and also raise some objections that one might have here. So I guess there's this really commonplace tendency to regard ignorance as something negative, right? So we often use it as a slur, we often use it in a derogatory manner, in ordinary language use, for instance. And what we would often do is focus on negative aspects of ignorance. And this tendency is also mirrored in mainstream epistemology, for instance, as people who study knowledge and epistemic phenomena. And so what mainstream epistemologists stress or how they view ignorance is merely as an absence or a negative presence. So it's either the absence of knowledge or belief or it is the presence of false belief. So what they do mostly is they analyze static mental states of individuals. This is, for instance, also exemplified in this quote by Duncan Pritchard. So he says, we must situate this notion, so ignorance, in a wider epistemic axiology, whereby ignorance occupies a negative role in contrast to a fundamental epistemic good, whatever that might be. So be it knowledge, be it belief, be it justification, etc. Sorry, can I ask, maybe I'm the only one who wants epistemology. Yeah, yeah. Epistemology in philosophy is the study of knowledge. So for years and years and years, philosophers have asked this question, what makes knowledge knowledge? Is it true belief? Is it something else? Is it justification and true belief or something else? So it's a branch of philosophy, so you have different kinds of branches in philosophy. You have epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science. And epistemologists are interested in questions. How do people know? How do groups know? What factors influence knowledge acquisition, knowledge dissemination, etc.? Does this answer your question? And please, please ask interrupt because I'm not used to talking to non-philosophers and I think philosophers often hide behind their terms a bit. And actually I find these exchanges much more interesting, so thank you. Yeah, but what I think becomes quite clear is that in epistemology or accountness theory, as it's called in German, ignorance, at least in its mainstream renditions, is quite often seen, not always, but often as a flaw that we want to get rid of. And it's something negative. So I brought you some examples that might show what is wrong with those kinds of conceptions. So first of all think of such examples as a lack of knowledge about the origin of life or such examples as a lack of knowledge of precise movements of particles in quantum physics. So I think what the first set of examples shows us is that there are certain practical, structural, cognitive limitations to what can be known. So something that I would call non-knowledge. The second set of examples shows us that, so first example, so think of a lack of knowledge or critical awareness about a country's history. For instance, its colonial past or a lack of knowledge about symptoms of heart disease of people assigned female at birth. And I think what these examples show us is that ignorance is also something more than just an absence. It's an active practice sometimes. So it's socially constructed, it's politically motivated, and it is affecting communities. So I think these sets of examples make apparent that a lack of knowledge is not only negative, but can have some practical structural reasons sometimes, and that ignorance is something significantly more than a mere absence of belief, but, as I said, a social practice. So what I want to argue with my approach is that a useful account of ignorance should not only tell us what ignorance is, so is it the absence of belief, is it the absence of justification, but it should also reveal what ignorance does and how ignorance is done, by whom, to what end. So I want to ask about the functions, the diverse functions of ignorance. And so this is not a claim of novelty, although I think my account can add something new here. Philosophers like to always say they do something radically new. But my approach is very much inspired by a set of approaches that already exist in, for instance, feminist epistemology, but also in critical race studies. What I would subsume under the label of substantive practice accounts of ignorance. So this is a term by Linda Alcoff. And so what these accounts would stress is that ignorance is situated, that it is sometimes strategic, it is a social and epistemic practice, it is a collective phenomenon that pertains to specific groups, it can also be an oppressive tool, of course. And here is a quote by Nadia El-Kassar, for instance. So she says, ignorance as a negative condition, she regards ignorance as a negative condition with detrimental effects on oppressed subjects in unjust societies. So I think this is a huge focus of these sets of theories. They make a strong connection between ignorance and forms of wrongdoing, discrimination, oppression, which obviously is very important and also part and parcel of my approach. So if you think of such phenomena as, for instance, climate change denialism, genocide denialism, populist argumentation, misinformation, etc. I think these accounts do a brilliant job and are very important in understanding these sorts of political phenomena. So what my account, I think, can add here is, so if we say that ignorance is a practice, and I think I'm absolutely sure this is what I want to say, how precisely does this practice operate? So I want to be a bit more precise about their key concepts of substantive practice accounts. And also I think this, as I said, this focus on negative detrimental effects of ignorance is very important, but I think there's more to it. So I want to understand the multitude of social functions of ignorance, specifically also their role in providing tools against oppression and being a strategy of resistance. And as I said, this is going to be the focus today. So this is a very brief discretion into my account, and I'm going to really keep this short. I just want you to know how I got to think of all these things, what I do. I also want to introduce you with my case study because this really got me thinking about ignorance as a strategy of resistance for marginalized groups. So my account introduces three axes of novelty to the study of ignorance. So first of all, I use a specific method, namely I construct a genealogy of ignorance, but a concept, a fictional imaginary genealogy. I'm going to say something about this in a little while. I'm also working with empirical inputs, so I have a case study. I did qualitative interviews with, so my case study is the unrecounted history or the mostly invisible history of layman migration in Austria and the system of guest work, the era of guest work in Austria. And I also draw a bit on social theory. This will not play a role today. So just to give you a brief, very brief idea of what imaginary conceptual genealogies do. So of course, as I think, I hope I made clear, philosophers like to work with concepts. And then what philosophers like to do is ask such questions as what actually is justice, what is friendship, and me as an epistemologist, or what epistemologists often ask, would ask is what is knowledge, for instance. And then what they would often do is analysis so they will try to give you necessary sufficient conditions in order to explain what knowledge is what an epistemic concept means so to say and so in my thesis I took a different approach that is inspired by a specific tradition in epistemology, namely function-first epistemology. And so what function-first epistemologists do is they say that concepts and ideas are most effectively understood not through analysis, but by exploring their origins and functions. And they do so through a specific method that is mostly at home in political philosophy, namely through constructing a state of nature scenario and then asking why would people in this state of nature scenario introduce specific epistemic concepts. So state of nature scenarios are just like thought experiments we could say where we imagine a very minimized social community and this is a cooperative community but there's also power structures in place in and out groups, differential group interest etc. And then we would ask why would they introduce the concept of ignorance, for instance? What would that concept do for that community? What function would that concept have? And so what I tried to do as a first step is exactly that, give a genealogy of ignorance. And as I said, I'm going to keep this brief. My genealogy has two stages, and so in the first stage, I argue that ignorance as a concept should not just be understood as the mere opposite to knowledge as a concept. So Edward Craig, for instance, another person doing function-first epistemology, he says, so people in this minimized state of nature would introduce the concept of knowledge to flag good informants. And I think if we just think of ignorance as the flagging of bad informants, this would not give us a very helpful concept of ignorance. So what I tried to show is that ignorance is introduced to flag a particular type of bad informant. So someone who looks like an informant because they possess the relative qualities, they have access to information, but they, for some reason, fail to fulfill this role. And I think this is very important because it shows us an important difference between non-knowledge and ignorance. So ignorance can be a decision, it can be a normative failure, whereas non-knowledge and ignorance. So ignorance can be a decision, it can be a normative failure, whereas non-knowledge often means that people do not have access to certain relevant kinds of information or there's practical limitations to what can be known. And in the second stage of this genealogy, social situations become more complex. And here I try to show how ignorance eventually develops into a social practice with diverse social functions and diverse modes of operation, so diverse mechanisms of operation. So the second part of my approach, the empirical input, so the case study. So it's very important, I think, that we keep in mind that this is an exercise of idealization that I did here. So it's an abstraction, these states of nature scenarios, they are, in the end, pieces of fiction, one could almost say, and I think they're very powerful in helping us to make sense of complex phenomena, but they also need to come to an end at some point. And this is also what, for instance, Bernard Williams says. So he says, imaginary genealogies must eventually come to an end and be combined with real history and cultural contingencies. And so in my thesis, this is where the case study comes into play. So the history of labor migration in Austria and the surrounding mechanisms of ignorance. So I'm just going to give a very brief summary of this because I think some of you might be familiar with this. So in Austria we had labor recruitment agreements in the 60s and 70s. This was due to a significant shortage of labor in those times and we had labor recruitment agreements with Turkey and former Yugoslavia and what is really just important to know for you now is that Austria actively benefited from that sort of structured labor migration, and Austria's economic success was heavily reliant on guest workers. But what happens still today is, I think there's very little official recognition of that historical period of Austria. There's little public sites of remembrance. Up to, like like until recently there this part of Austrian history has not been discussed in official longer-term exhibitions in museums for instance this has changed now if you go to the Nubian Museum and for me most strikingly I never learned about this in school and I don't know if any of you have but it's not part of any school curricula so I also asked for instance high school history teachers if they teach that part of Austrian history. There's also this very gross statement by our chancellor where he said the Austrian government should not repeat the mistake of the 1960s and 70s when so-called guest workers were brought in, but then, contrary to expectations, stayed here and caused integration problems. So this is a very gross misrepresentation of what actually happened, because as I said Austria had this really strong positive interest in bringing migrants migrant workers into the country and actively benefited from that sort of labor migration to this day so still when we think about the sectors of care work harvest work Austria still heavily relies on migrant workers. So obviously this also triggered outrage and grief among former guest workers who have been Austrian citizens for years, whose kids, the kids who have been born in Austria are Austrians. So yeah, this is just a very ugly thing to say, I would say. is just a very ugly thing to say, I would say. So what I did is I did qualitative interviews. So I did narrative and structured and oral history interviews with former labor migrants and guest workers, but also with historians and social scientists to understand this sort of collective level institutionalized ignorance that was going on here or is going on here. But I really want to stress I'm not a social scientist although I had the chance to be supervised by a social scientist for the last four years. I use this material to inform my theorizing on ignorance. And specifically, what this integration of the conceptual genealogy with the findings in the interview allowed me to do is be more precise about certain mechanisms of ignorance, as I have listed here, but I'm not going to go into detail here, and also about the multitude of different social functions of ignorance. So obviously there's this strong oppressive social function, but also I think it's important to understand positive functions, as I already said, and specifically in this talk, I want to talk about liberatory function of ignorance as a strategy of resistance for marginalized communities. So in order to convey my argument, I have to do one more theoretical step, and then I can go into the examples. I hope that's all right for you, and please tell me if I'm too fast or overwhelming you here. But as I said already, I do not want to make just an argument about, yeah, ignorance can be bliss, and I also do not want to claim that there's just a reappropriation of the practice of ignorance, and this can be either oppressive or positive, but I really want to stress that resistant ignorance should be understood as a critical achievement of marginalized groups. And in order to make this claim, I have to tell you something about standpoint theories. So standpoint theorists argue that there's certain perspectives, particularly those of oppressed groups, that can actually have benefits for the kinds of knowledges that can be produced. So it can lead to the formulation of critical standpoints. And standpoint theorists operate with three claims. So one, they say that knowledge is situated, so what we know, what we cannot know, is actually dependent on how we are socially situated in the world, and this social situatedness can actually also have some epistemic advantages. So people situated on the margins can actually have critical insights into social reality that more dominantly situated people could not have. And lastly, and this is really important for my point here, standpoints are not, so standpoint knowledge, this critical knowledge, is not automatically activated, but it should be understood as an achievement. And this achievement comes about through, for instance, consciousness raising, coalition building, awareness groups, actively doing politics and talking to your peers who have similar perspectives on the world. of resistant ignorance that I want to look into involves standpoint knowledge of what to ignore, with whom not to engage, what to unlearn, etc. And so this is what I want to focus on for the last part of this talk. Again, there are many interesting accounts in ignorance-friendly epistemology, for instance, by Lindsay and Matthias. So I'm not going to go into these, just to tell you that this is not radically new work, but I think what is interesting is that I can bring a systematization of these kinds of positive forms of ignorance. And there's an account by Cynthia Townley that is really important, where she describes that it's really important to sometimes cultivate ignorance as a virtue, as something how we should engage with others. For instance, because it facilitates relations of trust, of empathy, etc. And so what I call ordinary forms of ignorance or regular forms of ignorance, as Matthias and Lindsay call them, and ignorance as a strategy of resistance. And so I'm going to just focus on some of these phenomena, namely the division of epistemic labor, refusal of information sharing, refusal of inquiry, and instances of strategic deceit, legitimate deceit. So let me begin with ordinary forms of ignorance, but I'm going to keep this very brief because I think Matthias is going to speak a bit about that, if I'm not mistaken. But what I want to highlight is that ignorance can sometimes be really productive for society. So this is what I call a division of epistemic labor. So self-describing ignorance and non-knowledge and realizing, well, others just know better than me and I can outsource my inquiries, my questions to others is sometimes really helpful. So it's really rational to remain ignorant about certain things. And also inquiry is costly in terms of time we can just not be knowledgeable and become experts on on any on everything so to say secondly and i think this is kind of related is we should cultivate epistemic virtues such as the virtue of humility so the virtue of saying hey i don't know i need others to teach me stuff especially i think and this is something a colleague of mine is working on what they call knowledgeability pressure so i think we always live in in rooms in conference rooms in, where this knowledgeability pressure is the norm, so to say. So my colleague, Somo, they describe it as, there's a dominant social norm that renders being knowledgeable, wise or smart as generally valuable, desirable or admirable, whereas claiming ignorance is bad or neutral or neutral at best. So I think what is really important is that we learn to cultivate environments where not knowing is actually not sanctioned, but accepted and maybe also sometimes seen as something positive, to say, hey, I don't know, I just need you to tell me and learn. But now to the second set of phenomena that I, as I already said, call ignorance as a strategy of resistance. And so I want to focus on these two sets of phenomena that I think are in the vicinity of what I'm interested in, namely the producing of ignorance, the production of ignorance, and refusals of sharing information. And here are three phenomena that I will talk about, namely the keeping of oppositional secrets, strategic omissions and strategic deceit. And then secondly, the cultivating of ignorance and certain refusals of inquiry or engagement. And here I'm going to talk about something that is called epistemic respite and what I call instances of critical ignoring. So let me begin with the refusal of sharing information. So I think at times it's very important to understand that part of a liberatory epistemology is to not share certain kinds of information. For one, to protect vulnerable groups, and on the other hand, also to strengthen inner group processes. For instance, belief formation, coalition building, consciousness raising, being clear about what certain political aims and agendas should be. So we'll start with the keeping of oppositional secrets first. So I think the strategic withholding of information has specific history, political and liberatory history. So think, for instance, of keeping abortion practices secret. This is something that Annie Arnault describes in her novel, L'Evénement, or not disclosing the location of women's shelters, of queer spaces, of, for instance, the Underground Railroad. So the keeping of oppositional secrets can actually protect vulnerable groups. This is something that also came up in the interview, a bit different, but I think it relates here. So this is from a former guest worker. And she said, sometimes it was uncomfortable to speak my mother tongue in public, so I often did not do it. You could see it in the looks that you got when you spoke Serbo-Croatian. Back then, one hardly heard any foreign languages in the streets or on the bus, so we're in the 60 that you got when you spoke Serbo-Croatian. Back then one hardly heard any foreign languages in the streets or on the bus in the 60s in Austria. That's different today. Today it's quite natural and normal but back then it was not. Sometimes it was dangerous to out yourself as a non-German speaker. I have to say I think this keeping of oppositional secrets clearly is not a strategy that everyone can use certainly because some identity markers are just visible but in these instances I think it becomes clear that not sharing information about yourself or your group can have certain liberatory resistant functions. Secondly, what I call strategic omissions. So sometimes refusing to share information, again, is legitimate when it serves to protect vulnerable groups. I already said that, but this is something a bit different. Here I mean the strategic omission of certain kinds of information. So this is also a quote by an interviewee. She's a social scientist from Turkey, now works in Austria. And she says, I found a text from the Turkish labor market service, which they handed out to people, so to guest workers. These were recommendations for, for example, how to behave towards women. This was also in the 70s, I think. Go to bed early, always be respectful, things like that. Write letters to your family, send money. But also, if an Austrian woman says no, it means no. I translated some of these recommendations in my article, but I hesitated to translate the last one because I didn't want to reinforce the common prejudice that men of Turkish or Arab origin don't know consent. So here, this scholar describes a situation where she thought about leaving a specific kind of information out in order not to perpetuate problematic stereotypes and not feed into the trope of important violence. And I think this is a trope that right now in the pre-election season is coming up day in, day out. So this is what I call strategic omissions. Then the last strategy here about the value of not sharing certain kinds of information is what I call with Alison Bailey actually strategic deceit. So Bailey gives an example, namely the example of abolitionist writer Frederick Douglass, who actually deceived white boys into teaching him how to read and write by feigning ignorance, so by feigning illiteracy. And by that, he was able to get writing lessons. And so this is a strategy of resistance that I think uses dominant misconceptions as a basis for active creative responses to oppression. So this is a way of preempting an audience's failure to see wrongly. And this moment of resistance is enacted through this strategic deception that is actually a form of masquerading as a form of self-defense and sometimes even survival. And I want to add to this that I think I have this in my objections. We can discuss about the usefulness of such strategies, but I think there's actually a lot of agency in being able to preempt the failure of your audience and understanding that they're gonna misinterpret you and use this to your own benefits and the second kind of phenomena is what I call refusal of inquiry or engagement so what I mean here is situations where one selectively directs one's attention to endeavors that advance liberatory objectives while shielding oneself from dissenting perspectives that jeopardize one's livelihood and well-being. So the first kind of example is what I call, following Natalie Ashton, who's a great political epistemologist, epistemic respite. So epistemic respite describes instances in which our beliefs and standpoints and also political commitments are actually strengthened if we're not confronted with detrimental views. And this is something that is not a strategy that is employable every time and all the time, so I think there's a certain time span, it's temporary, but sometimes I think it's very helpful not to be confronted with opposing viewpoints right away, especially if you, you know, as a group want to identify your common goals, your common vulnerabilities, etc. So this is what Natalie calls epistemic respite. So reduced epistemic friction so that like-minded individuals can build communities around what they have in common. Again, this is something that is temporary and flexible. And the last strategy here, what I call critical ignoring. So an ignoring and distancing oneself from certain knowledge practices that have problematic origin, for instance. And this is something that mainly got me thinking when I read feminist science and technology studies literature, because they have something that is quite interesting, which they call strategic science literacy. So the ignoring, unlearning, or rewriting those scientific research projects which operate with biased and flawed background assumptions. So, for instance, no longer engaging with such things as cognitive differences research. This is an example by Janet Kurani. And my last point here, I think critical ignoring does also extend to whole knowledge systems. And I think especially philosophy, who has ignored quite a few knowledge systems that were not part of the global north, should actually now maybe start a process of decolonizing that kind of epistemology and philosophy. So this is something also that Linda Alcove proposes, who is, by the way, a philosophy hero for me. So she questions the dominance of master epistemologies of the global north and their presumed right to judge, for instance, knowledge claims of midwives or the ontologies of First Nations people, medical practices of the colonized, etc. So I think critical ignoring also involves unlearning universal knowledge claims about what counts as knowledge and about what counts as credibility, what counts as a reliable source, etc. So I think I'm going to leave out this because I see I've already talked for a while. I'm just gonna address some objections and pitfalls to these proposals. Because as I said in the beginning, I think I tried to make clear what I wanted to convey with resistant ignorance, but I also understand that this is certainly also risky strategy sometimes so for instance when we think about the fact of keeping oppositional secrets or Refusing to share certain kinds of information to protect a specific group We're confronted with another set of problems which could could could be the problem of self silencing This is something that Christy Dodson, a philosopher working in political epistemology, raises. So she says because, for instance, black women have followed norms of racial solidarity and kept silent about sexual violence by black men, they actually also self-silenced in a way in order to not perpetuate these stereotypes about the black violent individual. Quite the opposite is happening in strategies of deceit. So what I introduced with this abolitionist writer who feigns ignorance in pretending not to be able to read and write in order to learn it better so I think here we are confronted with the problem of actual perpetuation of problematic stereotypes so if we use that strategy or if people use that strategy how should we end these kinds of how can we break the cycle of these kinds of stereotypes? Lastly, the process of critical ignoring. So for instance, virtuous ignorance, strategic science, illiteracy, no longer engaging with certain kinds of doing research, I think has the downside of high stakes. So as I said there is a significant knowledgeability pressure especially for marginalized groups for instance in academic settings. So people actually need to always prove that they are knowledgeable and deserving to be in these kinds of rooms. So the question is who can actually afford to no longer engage with certain discourses, even if they are problematic and we should no longer address them or just drop them. Yeah, so I think this was my contribution here. I'll leave the conclusion open. And thank you for listening. And I hope I didn't overdo it with the philosophy. Thank you.