My name is Brigitte Aulenbacher and I will facilitate this talk and discussion with Nancy Fraser and as commentator Andrea Snovy. Yesterday, we introduced Nancy Fraser to the audience by presenting some aspects of her work and life in the frame of the inauguration event of the Karl Polanyi Guest Professorship. event of the Carl Polanyi Guest Professorship. We are very honored and delighted that she accepted in our invitation to come to us as our first Carl Polanyi Guest Professor. And we are very delighted to have more than one talk. And we can listen to her second talk in the lecture series, Counter-Movements, Putting the Economy in Its Place, today. As many of you have participated yesterday, I will avoid to have too much repetition and decided to have a very short introduction of Nancy Fraser and Andreas Novy to our audience today. Nancy Fraser is one of the most renowned philosophers, but her work is very well read in sociology as well as in political sciences and in many more disciplines. She draws on very strong traditions, intellectual traditions, like critical theory. In particular, she had controversies with Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. And she draws on Marx as well as on Karl Polanyi and Antonio Gramsci. She elaborated an own theory of social justice and she elaborated a feminist and intersectional analysis of capitalism. feminist and intersectional analysis of capitalism. And last but not least, she is working not only in the inner core of science, but also in controversies, in discussions, in debates with the public, and she stimulates debates and raises a lot of questions, which are of very high relevance for contemporary capitalism. Her analysis of the crisis of contemporary capitalism is remarkable for many reasons. Just to mention some of her recent publications, we have Capitalism, a Conversation in Critical Theory. It's a conversation between Nancy Fraser and Rahel Yegi, and they draw on critical theory as well as on Marx, as well as on Polanyi, and they are writing a very rich diagnosis of contemporary capitalism, of the ecological, the social, the political crisis, as well as the economic crisis. And I want to mention just two recent books. The next one I want to mention is Feminism for the 99% Manifesto. Nancy Fraser has co-authored it with Cynthia Abruzza and Titi Bhattacharya. And it's really interesting because it's a kind of plea for a reversal of the subordination of the social and ecological reproduction to the economic production and a very vivid plea for another future and a feminist future as well as an eco-socialist future. And the last one I want to mention here is Nancy Fraser's very interesting plea for progressive populism. She draws on Antonio Gramsci and takes the title by quoting Gramsci, the old is dying and the new cannot be born. And it's a really interesting plea for activism and for activism in the sense of redistribution and recognition, what is a very important part of her theory of social justice. So I'm very pleased that Nancy Fraser agreed to have a second talk, which draws and refers to the talk of yesterday. But of course, it's possible, if you did not participate in the yesterday event, to listen to this talk without any information about our yesterday event. So I'm very pleased that we can welcome you here, Nancy, and that you will give this second talk for us. And I want to welcome and to introduce to you Andreas Novi. Andreas Novi is a professor of socioeconomics at the Department of Multilevel Governance and Development at the WU Vienna. He is the president of the International Karl Polanyi Society and also co-organizer of our lecture series. Andreas Novy is very well known in the international discussion for his work on Karl Polanyi, as well as for his work on the foundational economy. And in Austria, I want to mention that he is one of the leading initiators of the congress Gutes Leben für Alle, which is very prominent in Austria. And he received the Kurt Rothschild Award for his work on Karl Polanyi. And recent publications are Karl Polanyi, The Life and Works of an Epochal Thinker. And I mentioned this because you can have a free download from the homepage of the International Karl Polanyi Society. publications, The Political Trilemma of Contemporary Social Ecological Transformation, Lessons from Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Globalizations, and the book in German, which is very prominent, Zukunftsfähiges Wirtschaften. I'm really happy that Andreas agreed to give a comment. And yes, I would say, let us start, because I know many people want to discuss in the chat, and we should not lose too much time. So the floor is yours, Nancy. Brigitte, for that very generous introduction and to Katia for organizing this and for the whole team and all the many institutions, including the International Karl Polanyi Society. I'm really happy to be able to give this second lecture. For those who did hear yesterday's, this is really part two, but as Brigitte said, I'm going to present it in such a way that you will follow perfectly, even if you didn't hear the first. This part really fits your theme of counter-movements, putting the economy in its place. Because yesterday, I gave a kind of a structural analysis of what I call capitalism's ecological contradiction. And I'm going to recap that very, very briefly again here today. But I mainly want to focus on the question of movement and counter movement, and all of the social struggles that are unfolding and that will certainly continue to unfold in the wake of our ecological general crisis. So let me start by saying that in a way, the entire lecture is a gloss on the title, the title Against the Environmentalism of the Rich, What Capitalism's History Can Teach Us About Ecopolitics. That title contains four terms that require some elaboration, namely ecopolitics, the environmentalism of the rich, capitalism, and history. And I'll be talking most about history, but I want to start by saying a few words about each of those three other terms. And I'll begin with the term eco-politics. I'm using that to cover the entire array of contemporary political perspectives and projects or activist orientations that include a response to climate change, that treat global warming as real and requiring action. And by calling all of these part of the large field of eco-politics, I want to stress the huge variety of orientations that presently occupy our political landscape. For example, just to give you a sense of how various this field is, the militant young activists epitomized by Greta Thunberg, activists epitomized by Greta Thunberg, who are demanding immediate radical action on carbon emissions, movements which have pre-existed this moment for degrowth that pin the wrap on consumerist lifestyles and that propose to transform our ways of living. Indigenous communities defending their habitats from corporate extractivism and advocating non-instrumental ways of relating to nature. Feminists who've been mobilizing for forms of life that sustain reproduction, both social and natural. Black Lives militants who are targeting environmental racism. Social Democrats who are militating for a Green New Deal, right wing populists who aim to preserve their own green spaces and natural resources by excluding others, usually racialized others. governments in the global south who are claiming a right to development and popular movements that advocate commoning or a solidary and social economy. are using neoliberal carbon offset schemes to enclose land, dispossess those who live from them, and capture new forms of monopoly rent. Corporate and financial interests who are speculating in eco-commodities and aim to ensure that the global climate regime remains market-centered and capital-friendly. All of this is eco-politics, and what the list shows is that eco-politics is all over the map. This is a large, confused, and contested field containing perspectives that not only diverge, but often really conflict. I believe that this field is still relatively open and unsettled, and that nothing decisive will happen until and unless it gets organized. That is, until the mass of conflicting eco-opinion resolves into a relatively clear set of opposing camps separated by a relatively clear fault line. So the pressing question is which perspectives in this large and confused field will predominate? Which will succeed in wooing enough of the others to create a hegemonic block in support of a shared project. Now, here's the Gramscian element that Brigitte mentioned. In this situation, safeguarding the planet requires building a counter hegemony. What is needed is to resolve the present cacophony of eco-opinion into an eco-political common sense that can orient a broadly shared project of transformation. Such a common sense must cut through the mass of conflicting views and identify exactly what in society must be changed in order to stop global warming. In other words, it needs to effectively link the authoritative findings of climate science to an equally authoritative account of the socio-historical drivers of global warming. historical drivers of global warming. To become hegemonic, however, this is my claim, a new common sense must transcend the quote-unquote merely environmental. Addressing the full extent of the present crisis, it must connect its ecological diagnosis to other vital concerns, including livelihood insecurity, denial of labor rights, public disinvestment from social reproduction and chronic undervaluation of care work, ethno-racial imperial oppression and gender and sex domination, dispossession, expulsion, exclusion of migrants, militarization, political authoritarianism, police brutality. These concerns are intertwined with and exacerbated by global warming, to be sure. But the new common sense must avoid what I'd like to call reductive ecologism. You all know what reductive economism is, but let's also talk about reductive ecologism. You all know what reductive economism is, but let's also talk about reductive ecologism. Far from treating global warming as a trump card that overrides everything else, the perspective I'm advocating needs to trace that threat to underlying societal dynamics that also drive other strands of the present crisis. Only by addressing all major facets of this crisis, environmental and non-environmental, and by disclosing the connections among them, can we envision a counter-hegemonic bloc that backs a common project and possesses the political heft to pursue it effectively. Now, that's a very tall order to be sure, but what brings it in within the realm of the possible is a, dare I say, happy coincidence. Namely, all roads lead to one idea, namely capitalism. Capitalism, in the sense I defined in yesterday's lecture, and I'm going to recap here, represents the principal socio-historical driver of climate change, hence the core institutionalized dynamic that must be dismantled in order to stop it. But capitalism so defined is also deeply implicated in seemingly non-ecological forms of social injustice, from class exploitation to racial imperial oppression and gender and sexual domination. And capitalism figures centrally, in seemingly non-ecological societal impasses, in crises of care and social reproduction, of finance, supply chains, wages and work, of governance and de-democratization. Anti-capitalism, therefore, could, and in fact, I would say should, become the central organizing motif of a new common sense. Disclosing links among multiple strands of injustice and irrationality, it represents the key to developing a powerful counter-hegemonic block of eco-societal transformation. Now, I began an argument for that idea yesterday, and I will extend that argument here. But first, I want to say something about the other phrase in my title, the environmentalism of the rich. That's an expression that I coined by referring to, That's an expression that I coined by referring to, indeed, by inverting Joan Martinez Allier's term, environmentalism of the poor. That's the title, actually, of a very important book that he wrote. of the poor refers, in his view, to the struggles of poor communities, mainly but not only in the global South, to counter neo-imperial corporate assaults on their natural surroundings. Not in the form of defending abstract nature with a capital N, but understood as defending habitats that are inextricably entwined with their ways of life, with their livelihoods, with their communities, with the social reproduction of their lives, and with their political identities. In other words, as Martinez-Alier understands it, the environmentalism of the poor is integrative. It brings together a set of interlinked existential concerns, including some that we would call ecological, and others that have traditionally defined as perhaps not obviously ecological. Rather than separate out harms to non-human nature, capital N, the environmentalism of the poor treats those as deeply entangled with harms to human communities. Now, by contrast, what I'm calling the environmental rich is single-issue environmentalism, single issue environmentalism. Environmentalism understood as nature defense, uncontaminated by any so-called extraneous concerns, such as social justice, livelihood security, democracy, social reproduction of human communities. My claim, and I think that Martinez-Ellier would agree, my claim is that those concerns, those apparently non-environmental concerns, appear to be extraneous only to those people whose livelihoods, political rights, and community survival are not existentially threatened. For everyone else, they're not at all extraneous. Just as single-issue feminism, in my view, can only be a feminism of the relatively privileged, that's a thesis that we argued in Feminism for the 99%, argued in feminism for the 99%. So single-issue environmentalism can only be an environmentalism of the rich. In both cases, what purports to be an emancipatory movement actually represents the interests of a relatively small elite and can even be harmful to the vast majority. and can even be harmful to the vast majority. I'll be arguing that in more detail as I go on. These two terms, environmentalism of the poor and environmentalism of the rich form a pair, obviously. They stand in opposition to one another. And this pair therefore suggests one possible way of simplifying the eco-political field that I just described. In this case, their opposition would become the paramount division, the central fault line around which the whole of eco-politics would be organized, and in relation to which every eco-political perspective would have to situate itself. The key question for eco-politics then would be, which side are you on? Now, that question brings us, I think, to capitalism. As these terms function in this discourse I've been using, rich and poor, and here I come to Brigitte's point about populism, these are populist terms, populist surrogates, I would say, for class categories. As such, they're sort of on a par with other populist terminology like the 99% and the 1%, which I have used in the Feminist Manifesto. Like all populist language, these terms are simplified and somewhat lacking in analytical precision, but that doesn't mean we can't use them productively if we're careful in the way we do that. These terms have great mobilizing power, in part because they direct our attention to the structure of the field in which eco-politics plays out. plays out. These terms rightly suggest that this is a deeply unjust field in which a relatively small number of humans live comfortably and long, while the vast majority suffer and die relatively young. Now, the name I have been using for quite a while and want to propose to you again today, the best name for that social field is capitalist society. Capitalism, after all, is the social formation, I will claim, that has brought us global warming. As I argued in yesterday's lecture against those who speak more vaguely of anthropogenic climate change, the principal socio-historical agent of global warming is not humanity in general, not our species in general, but the small class of entrepreneurs and investors who have engineered and who profit from the system of production and transport that is bombarding the atmosphere with greenhouse gases. They haven't done this contingently, moreover, as a result of some freak accident. Rather, as I argued yesterday, they have been strongly incentivized to do this by a social system that gives them the means, motive, and opportunity to savage the planet. And I want to very briefly recap that argument for those who weren't here yesterday. Capitalist societies, and this is a Polanian point, capitalist societies split the economy off from the latter's non-economic background conditions, which include nature. which include nature. At the same time, they establish a contradictory relation between the economic foreground and these background realms, one of which is nature. On the one hand, the accumulation of capital relies on nature, both as a tap, which supplies material and energic inputs to commodity production, and also as a sink for absorbing the latter's waste. On the other hand, capitalist society incentivizes owners who are bent on maximizing their profits to commandeer nature's gifts as they think of them as cheaply as possible, while absolving them of any obligation to replenish what they take or to repair what they damage. So this is a system that is premised on the false assumption that nature can replenish itself autonomously and without end. autonomously and without end. And that means that capitalism is more than a relation to labor, as it's often been seen. It is also a relation to nature. It's a predatory extractive relation, which consumes ever more biophysical wealth in order to pile up ever more profits. in order to pile up ever more profits. But what also piles up non-accidentally is an ever-growing mountain of eco-wreckage. Now, this in a nutshell is what I've called capitalism's ecological contradiction, a contradiction lodged at the heart of capitalist society in the relation this society establishes between economy and nature. In other words, this contradiction is structural, built into the institutional framework, into the DNA of capitalist society. And that means that we cannot save the planet without disabling some core defining features of our social order. Hence, my first conclusion, eco-politics must be anti-capitalist. But that's not all. As I also argued yesterday, capitalism's ecological contradiction is entangled with several other contradictions which are equally structural and equally deeply entrenched. These, too, tend to precipitate crises and struggles which entwine with the ecological. is capitalism's social reproductive contradiction, which is rooted in the system's gendered divide between commodity production and unpaid care work. In this arrangement, production presupposes reproduction, which forms and replenishes the system's human subjects, including the paid workers from whom capital extracts surplus value. Yet, capital accords care work no value in the monetized sense, treats it as free and infinitely available, and assumes no responsibility for sustaining it. So, in the same way as it does with respect to nature, capitalist society is inherently prone to destabilize social reproduction. In fact, the two processes, the tendency to destabilize social reproduction and to destabilize natural reproduction or natural ecosystems, are hard to separate. Social reproduction is aimed at sustaining beings, human beings that is, who are simultaneously natural and cultural. It manages the interface of sociality and biology, community and habitat. When capital destabilizes the ecosystems that support human habitats, it simultaneously jeopardizes caregiving, as well as the livelihoods and social relations that sustain it. When people fight back, conversely, it is often to defend the entire eco-social nexus at a single stroke. That's that idea of the environmentalism of the poor again, as if to defy the authority of capitalism's institutional divisions. So crises of care and nature therefore are almost always intertwined. The effects of these entwinements are especially hard on racialized populations, whom capitalism renders politically defenseless and available for plunder. The world capitalist system develops and expands in part by annexing chunks of nature for whose reproduction it does not pay. In appropriating nature, however, capital simultaneously expropriates human communities for whom the confiscated material and befouled surrounds constitute a habitat, a place of living, their means of livelihood, the material basis of their social reproduction. So these expropriated communities bear a hugely disproportionate share of the global environmental load. And they are historically racialized, as we know from the history of imperialism and enslavement and various forms of neo-imperial expropriation. Their expropriation affords other, let us say, whiter communities the chance to be sheltered, at least in part, from the worst effects of capitalism's cannibalization of nature. So the system's built-in tendency to ecological crisis and care crisis is tightly linked to its built-in tendency to create racially marked populations for expropriation. All told then, capitalism's ecological contradiction cannot be neatly separated from the system's other constitutive irrationalities and injustices. To ignore those others by adopting the reductive ecologistic perspective of single-issue environmentalism is to miss the distinctive institutional structure of capitalist society, dividing economy not only from nature, but also from state, care, and racial imperial expropriation. This society institutes a tangle of mutually interacting contradictions which need to be thought together in a single frame. And that brings me then to my second conclusion. Eco-politics must not only be anti-capitalist, but also trans-environmental, able to take in this larger field of entanglement. Well, that's the gist of my structural argument, which I presented yesterday in some greater detail. And it was an argument aimed to establish the principal thesis that an eco-politics aimed at saving the planet seriously committed to that end must be anti-capitalist and trans-environmental. And now I want to offer some further reflections in support of that thesis by turning to capitalism's history, which of course represents that fourth element of the title of this lecture, history. As I conceive it, this history, capitalism's history, unfolds across four distinctive periods or regimes of accumulation, which just to name them, are the mercantile capitalist phase spanning the 16th through 18th centuries, the liberal colonial phase of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the state-managed phase of the middle third of the 20th century, the so-called Troll de Glorieuse, and the current regime of financialized or neoliberalized capitalism. In each of these phases, the economy-nature relation has assumed a different guise, as have the crisis phenomena generated by it. Each phase, too, has precipitated distinctive types of struggles around and over nature. But one thing I think has remained constant throughout. In each phase, eco-crisis and eco-struggle have been deeply entwined with other strands of crisis and struggle, as I've already suggested, which are also grounded in structural contradictions of capitalist society. So let's look briefly at each of these four phases in turn, beginning with mercantile capitalism. In that phase, agriculture and manufacturing ran almost entirely on animal muscle, both human and non-human, meaning oxen, horses, and so on. Plus, of course, some wind and water. And in this respect, this was the situation for previous millennia. In other words, from the standpoint of energy, mercantile capitalism was not so different from pre-capitalist societies. Like them, it was what J.R. McNeill calls a somatic regime, meaning conversion of chemical into mechanical energy occurred inside the bodies of living beings, whether humans or working animals, as they digested food, which originated from biomass. And that meant that as in earlier eras, the only way to augment available energy was through conquest. Only by annexing land and commandeering additional supplies of labor could mercantile capitalist powers increase their forces of production. They did so, we know, with a vengeance on a vastly expanded scale, and this is what distinguishes them from earlier pre-capitalist regimes, on a vastly expanded scale which included the so-called new world as well as the so-called old world. In the system's periphery especially, these powers installed brutal regimes of socio-ecological extractivism. From the silver mines of Potosi to the slave plantations of Saint-Domingue, they worked land and labor to the point of exhaustion, making no effort to replenish what they expended, and leaving trails of environmental and social wreckage across whole continents. But the system's core regions, Europe, North America, were hardly exempted from expropriation either. There too, capitalist powers forcibly enclosed common lands or commandeered indigenous lands, dispossessing tenants and farmers and indigenous peoples of their customary use rights, upending the life worlds of rural populations. Now, in both cases, core and periphery, those on the receiving end fought back with varying degrees of success. varying degrees of success. Without much success, it must be said, truth be told. Aimed at countering wholesale assaults on their habitats, communities, and livelihoods, their resistance was necessarily integrative. Whether it was communalist, as it was in some cases counter-imperial, as in parts of Latin America, or republican, as in the case of Saint-Domingue or Haiti, as we now call it. This resistance combined what we would now call environmental struggles over, sorry, environmental struggles with struggles over labor, social reproduction, and political power. So this is a classic case of the environmentalism of the poor. The mercantilist regime gave way to its liberal colonial successor in early 19th century, above all in England, which pioneered the world historic shift to fossil energy. The coal-fired steam engines opened the way, again using McNeill's language, to the world's first exosomatic regime, that is the first to take carbonized solar energy from beneath the crust of the earth and to convert it to mechanical energy outside of living bodies, namely in an engine. So this energic process was tied only indirectly to biomass and the liberal colonial regime appeared, appeared is the key word, to liberate the forces of production from the constraints of land and labor. But this appearance was illusory. Exosomatic industrialization in Europe, North America, and Japan rested on a hidden abode of somatic-based extractivism in the periphery. What made Manchester's factories hum was the massive import of what Jason Moore has called cheap natures, rested from colonized lands by masses of unfree and dependent labor. Cheap cotton to feed the mills, cheap sugar, tobacco, coffee, and tea to stimulate the hands who work them. Cheap bird shit, in fact, to feed the soil that fed the workers. And I'm thinking here of John Bellamy Foster's brilliant analysis with his co-authors of the guano gambit that involved further peripheral expropriation to fertilize depleted, exhausted soil in the global north. So all of this, in other words, the apparent savings of labor and land was actually a form of, and this is a beautiful concept, environmental load displacement. That is a shift in the demands placed on biomass from core to periphery. Theorists and historians of eco-imperialism are only now reckoning the full extent of this cost shifting, while also revealing the close connection of anti-colonialism with what we could call proto-environmentalism. In other words, rural struggles against liberal colonial predation were environmentalisms of the poor, struggles for what we might today call environmental justice, avant la lettre, struggles against the environmental load displacement. Now, in the capitalist core, this proto-environmentalism looked rather different during this period. We're still in the 19th century. The most celebrated version conjured a nature, capital N, that was viewed as sublime and beyond price, hence as demanding reverence and protection. Opposing extractivism, this perspective fed romantic conservative critiques of industrial society and eventually inspired standalone, let's call them by what I think is their rightful name, standalone environmentalisms of the rich, which focused on wilderness protection. Often thought to exhaust the whole of proto-environmentalism in this era, this perspective in reality coexisted with another one, which linked capital's assault on nature with class injustice. Key proponents of this second perspective were William Morris, whose eco-socialism included a powerful aesthetic dimension, and Friedrich Engels, whose social environmentalism focused initially on industrialism's deleterious impact on urban working class health, and later on what he called the dialectics of nature, or what we would now call co-evolutionism. Both those thinkers seeded very rich traditions of socialist ecology, which linked harms against nature to harms against human beings and especially the working classes among human beings. But these approaches were subsequently obscured by a narrow single issue understanding of environmentalism, which I'll get to later. Sorry, I didn't realize I was muted. I don't know how that happened. How long have I been muted? Do I need to go back and repeat something? A few seconds. Sorry, I must have hit a button by mistake. Okay, so I've been trying to talk about the other sort of forgotten tradition of social ecology in the liberal colonial era, which was eclipsed by the focus on single-issue environmentalism. And I mentioned William Morris and Friedrich Engels. And I was saying that they seeded very rich traditions of what we can now understand to be socialist ecological thought, socialist ecological thought, traditions that have been obscured subsequently by narrow single-issue understandings, single-issue definitions of environmentalism, and that are fortunately now being recovered and extended. And I wanted to mention John Bellamy Foster's very brilliant new book called The Return of Nature, which reconstructs this forgotten tradition of socialist ecological thought. of capitalism's history, which I've called state-managed capitalism. And this is a phase in which Britain is displaced by a new global hegemon, which orchestrates a vast expansion in greenhouse gas emissions. And that, of course, is the United States. The United States builds builds a novel exosomatic industrial complex in which the internal combustion engine, powered by refined oil, comes to the center. It's not that the steam engine disappears, but this is a whole new energy complex. Now, what is interesting, and I'm not going to belabor, you know what the effects of that have been in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, but I do want to suggest that, sorry, I don't know what that ringing means, but I'm not muted, right? I don't know what that ringing means, but I'm not muted, right? Okay. The United States begats in this same era a very powerful environmental movement. One current is the traditional one which descends from the nature romanticism of the previous regime and which centers on wilderness protection. So we have the creation of a vast, a large system of reserves and national parks, which we now understand, however, was built on indigenous displacement, stealing the lands of Native American peoples. That environmentalism of the rich was compensatory, aimed at enabling at least some Americans to escape industrial civilization temporarily, but not confronting industrial civilization directly, not trying to transform it. A compensatory outside, so to speak. a compensatory outside, so to speak. As state-managed capitalism developed, however, it hatched another environmentalism, which targeted the industrial nucleus of the regime. And that's the current that was galvanized by Rachel Carson's important book of the early 1960s, The Silent Spring, which pushed for state action to curtail corporate pollution. The result was the founding of the Environmental Protection Agency. We're so used to thinking of the US as a climate denier and laggard in environmentalism. I want to recover this early important history. They found the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, which is really the tail end of the state managed regime. The EPA was its last major effort to diffuse systemic crisis by, as the economists would say, internalizing the externalities, making them objects of state regulations. And in this sense, the EPA is the exact analog of social security and all of the New Deal forms of trying to sustain social reproduction by internalizing the externalities, taking the damage that the economy is doing to nature or to social reproduction and treating them as objects of state management. Its crown jewel, the APA's crown jewel, was the Superfund, which was tasked with cleaning up toxic waste sites on U.S. territory on capital's dime. It was financed chiefly by taxes on the petroleum and chemical industry. So in other words, this fund realized the principle of polluter pays through the coercive agency of the capitalist state, a very different approach to current carbon trading schemes, which you could say substitute the carrot from the stick and work not through state coercion, but through markets. So you could say in that respect, this state capitalist regulation of nature was somewhat more progressive than the current carbon trading regime. But like its social reproduction management, it was built on disavowed cost shifting. The regime unloaded eco-externalities disproportionately onto poor communities, especially communities of color, both in the core and in the periphery. In other words, it ramped up extractivism and environmental load displacement. I didn't spell this out, but you can understand. I would just go back to that idea of the internal combustion engine and refined oil apparatus, right? The whole geopolitics of big oil. And it's the profit making from all of these sectors that finance social reproductive policies and that provide the tax revenues to create what passes for a good life in the global north. In any case, U.S. environmentalism's industrial wing misframed its central issue of corporate pollution because it posited the national territorial state as the relevant unit for eco-policy at the same time that it was creating this environmental load displacement on a global scale. And of course, it failed to reckon with the inherently trans-border character of industrial emissions. That it was still a time when you could think that each country had its own nature. We were going to have clean air in the U.S. and whatever else happened elsewhere wouldn't matter. That oversight would prove especially fateful with respect to greenhouse gases, whose effects we now understand are by definition planetary. All of these problems continue on steroids today in the era of financialized capitalism, but on an altered basis. Relocation of manufacturing to the global south has scrambled the previous energic geography. Somatic and exosomatic formations now consist side by side throughout Asia, Latin America, and some regions of Africa. The global north, meanwhile, increasingly specializes in the so-called post-material triad of IT services and finance, Google, Amazon, and Global Sachs in the case of the U.S. But once again, as before, the appearance of liberation from nature is highly misleading. Northern post-materialism rests on southern materialism, mining, agriculture, manufacturing, as well as on some fracking and offshore drilling in its own backyard. Equally important, consumption in the global north is ever more carbon intensive. Witness steep rises in air travel, meat eating, cement paving, and overall material throughput. I could go on, but for the sake of time, I'm going to leave that as a very short description. Under these conditions, the grammar of eco-politics is shifting. As global warming has displaced chemical pollution as the central issue, so markets in emission permits have supplanted coercive state power as the go-to regulatory mechanism, and the international has replaced the national as the favorite arena of eco-governance. Environmental activism has altered accordingly. The wilderness protection current has weakened and indeed split, with one branch gravitating to the green capitalist power center I mentioned at the outset, the other to increasingly assertive movements for environmental justice. That latter rubric now encompasses a broad range of subaltern actors from southern environmentalisms of the poor, resisting enclosures and land grabs, to northern anti-racist targeting disparities in exposure to toxins, and to indigenous movements fighting pipelines, to eco-feminists battling deforestation. And it must be said that many of those movements are linked increasingly to one another and overlap to some degree with one another. At the same time, interestingly, state-focused projects, which I think had been lately sidelined, are very recently re-emerging with new vigor. As populist revolts, both left and right, have shattered belief in the magical properties of so-called free markets, some actors are returning to the view that national state power can serve as the principal vehicle of eco-societal reform. I'm thinking of eco-populist nationalists like Marine Le Pen, who now has something she calls the new ecology, that's one side, and green new dealers on the other side, right populism, left populism. Also, labor unions long committed to defending the occupational health and safety of those members, but until recently quite wary of curbs on development, are now looking to green infrastructure projects to create jobs. infrastructure projects to create jobs. Then at the other end of the spectrum, we have degrowth currents who are finding new recruits among youth, attracted by their bold civilizational critique of spiraling material throughput and a critique of consumer lifestyles, and by the promise of Buen Vivir through veganism, commoning, and or a social and solidary economy. Now, these historical reflections, which I've given you, which are quite brief and highly stylized, offer support, I think, for my two chief propositions. First, that capitalism harbors a deep-seated ecological contradiction that inclines it non-accidentally to environmental crisis. And second, that those dynamics are inextricably entwined with other non-environmental crisis tendencies and cannot be resolved in isolation from them. The justification lies, at least in part, in the close connection, which I've tried to evoke or demonstrate here, between ecological depredation and other forms of dysfunction cum domination inherent in capitalist society. First, the internal links between natural disfoliation and racial imperial expropriation, claims of terra nullius. To the contrary, the chunks of nature that capital appropriates are virtually always the life conditions of some human group, their habitat and meaning-laden place of social interaction, their means of livelihood, the material basis of their social reproduction. Moreover, the human groups in question are virtually always those who have been stripped of the power to defend themselves through conquest, enslavement, whatever, and often those that have been relegated to the wrong side of the global color lie. That point is evidenced, I think, again and again through the sequence of regimes. It shows that ecological questions cannot be separated from questions of political power on the one hand, nor from those of racial oppression, imperial domination, and indigenous dispossession and genocide, on the other hand. A similar proposition holds for social reproduction, which is closely imbricated, I've suggested, with natural reproduction. For most people, most of the time, ecosystemic damages add heavy stresses to the business of caregiving social provision, the tending of bodies and psyches, occasionally stretching social bonds to the breaking point. In most cases, too, the stresses bear down hardest on women who shoulder primary responsibility for the well-being of families and communities. But there are exceptions that prove the rule. These arise when power asymmetries enable some groups to offload the externalities onto others. As in the era of state-managed capitalism, when wealthy northern welfare states financed more or less generous social supports in the homeland by intensifying offshore extractivism. In that case, a political dynamic linking domestic social democracy to foreign domination enabled a racialized gendered trade-off of social reproduction here for eco-depredation there. Now, that's a bargain that capital's partisans have since rescinded by designing a new financialized regime that allows them to have it all. No wonder, then, that struggles over nature have been deeply entangled with struggles over labor, care, and political power in every phase of capitalist development, nor that single-issue environmentalism is historically exceptional and politically problematic. Remember the shifting forms and definitions of what counts as environmental struggle that I've evoked in the sequence of regimes. In the mercantile era, silver mining poisoned Peruvian lands and rivers, while land enclosures destroyed English woodlands and Native American hunting grounds, prompting considerable pushback in both cases. But participants in these struggles did not separate protection of nature or habitat from defense of livelihoods, political autonomy, or social reproduction of their communities. They fought rather for all those elements together and for the forms of life in which they were integrated. When nature defense did appear as a freestanding cause in the liberal colonial era, it was among those whose livelihoods, communities, and political rights were not existentially threatened. Unencumbered by those other concerns, their standalone environmentalism was necessarily an environmentalism of the rich. As such, it contrasted with the contemporaneous social environmentalisms I described in the core and with anti-colonial environmentalisms in the periphery, both of which targeted intertwined harms to nature and humans, thus anticipating present-day struggles for eco-socialism and environmental justice. But those movements were expunged from environmentalism's official history, which canonized the single-issue definition. The latter broadened somewhat in the following era of state-managed capitalism, as wilderness protectionists were joined by activists urging deployment of capitalist state power against corporate polluters. What eco-successes this regime achieved were due to its use of that power, while its failure stemmed from the refusal to reckon seriously with trans-environmental entanglements, with the inherently trans-territorial character of emissions, with the force of homegrown environmental racism, with the power of capital to subvert regulation by lobbying workarounds and regulatory capture, and with the limitations intrinsic to a focus on eco-abuses as opposed to the normal lawful workings of a fossil fuel consumerist economy. Now, all those evasions are alive, well, and still wreaking havoc today in the era of financialized capitalism. Especially problematic then and now is the guiding premise that the environment can be adequately protected without disturbing the institutional framework and structural dynamics of capitalist society. Will those failures be repeated today? Will our chances to save the planet be squandered by our failure to build an eco-politics that is trans-environmental and anti-capitals? What is needed is a clear and convincing perspective that connects all of our present woes, ecological and otherwise, to one and the same social system, and through that, to one another. capitalist society, conceived expansively to include all the necessary background conditions for a capitalist Polanyi, an insight I've gotten from Karl Polanyi, including non-human nature and public power, expropriable populations, and social reproduction, all non-accidentally subject to cannibalization by capital, all now under the wrecking ball and reeling from it. To name that system and conceive it broadly is to supply a piece of the counter-hegemonic puzzle we need to solve. This piece, I think, can help us align the others to disclose their likely tensions and potential synergies to clarify where they have come from and where they might go together. Anti-capitalism is the piece that gives a kind of political direction and critical force to trans-environmentalism. critical force to trans-environmentalism. If the latter opens eco-politics to the larger world, the former trains its focus on the main enemy. Anti-capitalism then is what draws the line necessary to every historical block between us and them, that line I evoked in the outset. between us and them, that line I evoked in the outset. Unmasking carbon trading as the scam that it is, it pushes every potentially emancipatory current of eco-politics to publicly disaffiliate from green capitalism. It pushes each current tomb to pay heed to its own Achilles heel, its own inclination to avoid confronting capital, whether that inclination appears in the form of pursuing what I think can only be an illusory de-linking, as in the case of de-growth, or by pursuing what can only be a lopsided class compromise, as in the case of the Green New Deal, or by pursuing what must end, I think, as tragic parity in extreme vulnerability, as in the case of environmental justice movements that take the focus on what is actually generating disparity and merely want to equalize. By insisting on their common enemy moreover, the anti-capitalist piece of the puzzle indicates a path that partisans of degrowth, environmental justice, and a Green New Deal, which I would say are the principal emancipatory or potentially emancipatory lines in the current field of eco-politics, a path they can travel together, even if they can't now envision, let alone agree on, the precise destination. It remains to be seen, of course, whether any destination will actually be reached or whether the earth will continue to heat to the boiling point. But our best hope for avoiding the latter fate is to build a counter-hegemonic block that is trans-environmental and anti-capitalist. Where exactly such a block will take us may not be fully clear, but if I had to give that destination a name, it would be eco-socialism. Thank you very much for your attention. Thank you very much for sharing this most impressive analysis of the capitalist society and the vision of eco-socialism. And before I give the word to Andreas, I have to read two comments from the chat. One is for the Arabic-speaking attendees. Arabic speaking attendees, the Wikigender project, you can reach it at Wikigender. It's translating and live tweeting in Arabic. Those of who wants to follow in Arabic can do this by this way. And there is a question whether the manuscript of the talk is available. I think it's part of your new book, and we will read it in fall if I'm informed right. May I just say that there is also a much longer version that covers the material in both the lectures in, I think it's still the current issue of New Left Review under the title Climates of Capital. And the argument is more fully presented there. Okay, thank you very much. And then I give the word to Andreas for the comment. the comment. Thank you very much for this presentation. There is so much that I agree on. Yesterday's keynote, today's lecture about single issue environmentalism, about populism, about your understanding of capitalism as an extended system that's more than the economy, and especially your plea at the end of this talk for broad alliance building, I can only endorse. I agree that it's a key question how to organize, how to create an alternative block. And the two comments that I will make, they will focus on this, aiming at improving our understanding of how to build such a hegemony and acknowledging some related difficulties. You mentioned yesterday, today, the slogan of the Occupy movement, the 1% against the 99%. And today you refer to a small class of entrepreneurs profiting from capitalism as well as causing current climate disaster. I do not contest because this simplifies reality, as I agree that political slogans have to simplify. I contest because I fear that this might mislead our understanding of the current conjuncture and the challenge we face in pursuing what you correctly call anti-capitalist, anti-environmental strategies which are urgently needed. To start with, I think it was Thomas Piketty who suggested that instead of talking about the one percent, we should talk about the one percent of the one percent, We should talk about the 1% of the 1%, something like 70,000 people. But that's not so important. Definitively, it's a very small group of persons who would not so much call entrepreneurs, but they are profoundly rentiers, extracting value at the expense of others. And I totally agree that limiting their power is crucial indeed, and it's necessary and urgent that economic power is deconcentrated. But I think it's not sufficient because it especially occupies 99%, which is a misleading concept, if the aim is to elaborate an alternative an alternative popular hegemonic block. The 99%, also, that's correct, not commanding socio-economic development, do not all oppose capitalism and not only because they are alienated. The history of capitalism is also, I would argue, a history of success and emancipation, I would argue a history of success and emancipation of individual liberation from different forms of domination and oppression. Just take the last round of extension of anti-discrimination legislation. Marx was aware of this emancipatory potential of capitalism. Polanyi was aware of the merits of what he called improvements, although he was worried that they destroy habitation. And even marketization can be liberating, as you, Nancy, have always insisted when talking about the commodification of female labor. Wage labor can free from precarious agricultural work, from famine, and alphabetism, traditional gender roles. Therefore, and by far not only in the global north and the west, significant sectors of the middle and working classes defend capitalist institutions and the Western mass consumerist way of living, labeled imperial mode of living by Uli Brandt and Markus Wissen. The power of right-wing populist reactionary movements, in my understanding, rests for a large part exactly in defending these customs, routines, habits, and consumption norms. and consumption norms, quite convenient ways of living that result from this. And Ingolfur Blüthorn, professor at my university, he calls this the sustainability of unsustainability. So that's the first point. And the second point related to the first one also concerns the question of the alternative hegemony you mentioned. You name it eco-socialism at the end, that's even the last word of your speech. You correctly insist on the necessity of a common understanding that capitalism is at the core of many, if not all, entangled problems we are facing, and you propose that it should be the common denominator to be contested. I agree up to a certain point. I agree that capitalist institutions, especially the accumulation imperative, the profit logic that is imposed on the production of use values, are incompatible with freedom, equality and solidarity in times of climate crisis. But I would assume that this alternative hegemony has to differ substantially from left politics of the 20th century in more than adding the eco. A key problem that you, Nancy, have dwelled on extensively is social protection and emancipation in extending the Polanian double movement to a triple movement. In my reading of Karl Polanian and using his insights for understanding our current transformation, I would go a step further. Both social protection and social emancipation can become reactionary if not contextualized. It is well documented that social protection, and you have written on this, can lead to chauvinism and be used for exclusionary forms of xenophobia and racism. However, the same is true for emancipation. For long, the history of the left has been interpreted as a history of social progress and individual emancipation of overcoming social control and increasing available choices for all, not only the selected few. But these increased freedoms, in part, and not only market freedoms, lead to increased emissions, putting stress on the climate, lead to exclusion and other problems. And this creates a tension not only between emancipation and social protection, but also between emancipation and collective action. Take one recent example of how emancipation is appropriated by supremacist political movements. Yesterday, the plea for freedom defeated the Spanish left in Madrid's regional election. A left that has defended a cautious treatment of the pandemic to protect vulnerable parts of the population. Madrid's electorate, in a trans-class alliance including segments of the poor, and that makes our problem worse, punished the ruling socialists and asserted its rights to freedom and mobility and leisure of visiting friends and going to the pub. In this respect, there are systematic similarities between the pandemic and the climate change. In both cases, collective action would be decisive. But contrary to Asian countries and not only the authoritarian ones, Western societies have not found a sound balance between individual freedom and effectively combating the pandemic. I would argue that this has to do with a lack of legitimacy of collective action to interfere in individual lives with a lack of democratic authority that is seen as legitimate in pursuing policies in favor of what Karl Polanyi calls freedom for all in a complex society. Polanyi in his closing chapter in the Great Transformation was clear that this requires planning and regulation, which by definition restrains individual freedom. An alternative hegemony, and that's your interest, that's my interest, and probably the interest of many of the persons in the audience, alternative hegemony to the current supremacist understanding of freedom that is able to obtain democratic maturities is urgently needed. It's probably the key question resulting from the two exciting presentations that you gave, Nancy, and it has always been at the core of Karl Polanyi's reflection as well. And in this sense, I see my comment somehow as a contribution to a dialogue. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Andreas, for this very focused comment and nancy do you want to respond immediately or shall i add some comments and questions from the chat well we could do it uh either way uh or if you want to bring other people in now that's fine i have it was a beautiful and rich comment and i have a few thoughts about it, but they can wait. It's up to you, Brigitte. Okay, then if it is okay for you too, Andreas, I would add a few comments which fit very well to your comment. Okay, so I would start with the comment of Stefan Jaksch. Where should we start forming this anti-capitalist, trans-ecological progressive movement? After all, capitalism has the ability to crush divided progressive movements quite easily, and the left has a tendency to split up in single issue movements. This is the comment I would like to add and the next comment I would like to add because it also fits very well is the comment of Erantos Beretta. What does actual praxis look like for building this eco-socialist hegemonic block in practical terms for not only the people in this lecture, but how do we build this block that challenges the perversive nature of capitalist consumer individualism, a movement then engages those entangled in their own struggles and may only see power within their consumption choices. I would add these two because I think they are very close to this discussion. they are very close to this discussion. Great. Well, thanks a lot to both of those questioners and again to Andreas. So why don't I try to reply first to him and then each to the two others. So on your first point, Andreas, I mean, first of all, about the problem of populism and populist language, I just want to clarify that I am, I think that we have two concepts of populism, a liberal concept, which simply equates it with demagogy and irrationality, and, you know, we'll tar all of it with the same brush. And I am very strongly opposed to that way of understanding populism. The Gramscian notion of populism is really connected to this idea of hegemony. He speaks of the national popular, and we might be a little concerned about the national there in the present moment. But basically, it is about constructing, or as Mouffreclat would say, articulating, so that we have some category in which many, many people can find themselves. Personally, for myself, I'm not sure if this would fly politically, but I would actually be happy who perform socially necessary activity under a great variety of conditions, which together end up benefiting capital far more than themselves. It might be that the term working class has become too freighted, too associated with a more traditional kind of communist thinking, and that it can't be used. But I think it's worth thinking about whether that term could be rehabilitated. about whether that term could be rehabilitated. It's more precise than, and just let me say that I, in deciding with Chinzia and Tithi to call our manifesto feminism for the 99%, we didn't mean to be signing on as card-carrying populists in the Chantal Mouffe sense. We actually use quite a bit of class analysis in the text of the manifesto. And so we're sort of trying to bring people to class analysis by way of a kind of populist entry point. And the last point on this is that I would say that I'm not an anti-populist, and I actually think that there are forms of left-wing populism that are a good entry point for people, also the beginning of a learning process, a transition to a more sociologically adequate account of the world that we live in, and that would lead, therefore, to a more precise programmatic idea. So let me just say, let me leave that populist point at that. And I completely agree with you about the sort of, I mean, both of your subsequent points about the appeal today, the very broad appeal of, okay, let's call it an imperial way of living, which even for those who are not in a position to enjoy it, may appear in the sort of mediascape as what the good life looks like and who want into it. The question, I think, let me retool an old line of Jürgen Habermas. For any of this to work, social reality has to meet us halfway. We can't conjure this out of this hegemony, this counter hegemony out of thin air. What it means to say it has to meet us halfway is that the experience of impasse, of crisis, of it not working anymore, has to be widespread enough for all sorts of people who might have and might still feel, you know, attracted to the imperial win, to just feel that they need to think and act differently, that they have to be open to out-of-the-box ideas, that the impasses, the dysfunctions are so great that it's not good enough anymore to do a patch-up job here and a tinkering there and so on and so forth. And as an American, I date the sort of break to 2016, the rise of Trump on the one side of Sanders on the other, this widespread revulsion against the whole sort of policy complex and stance of the elites and the dominant parties and politicians of the previous, I don't know, 20, 30 years, the search for something different. And that search doesn't at all guarantee a good outcome. It's a little bit like the 1930s. It's a little bit like, you know, the period that Polanyi was looking back on in the Great Transformation, where you get, you know, a clamoring for social protection, and we can add ecological protection, that, you know, takes wildly disparate forms, ranging from fascism to communism to the New Deal, and so on and so forth. That's, I think we're in that kind of situation. And so this gets to the other two questions. Stefan, where do you start from informing the movement? We don't start. The turmoil is there. The organizing is there. Wherever a given group or set of population finds itself in extremis, whatever it thinks is its most pressing question, whether it's an ecological question or a livelihood question or a question about migration or family provision. we don't start it. It happens where it happens. But I think what those of us who are looking at this in a more analytical way can do is to, and not just an analytical way, but I think that sort of, let's call them sort of socialist activists, for want of a better word, or eco-socialist activists. I think what we can do is think about the problem of connection. That's what hegemony, counter-hegemony is about. So it's offering a map, a perspective on which people engaged in the struggle that they're engaged in. And there's no second guessing you're wrong to focus on X, you should really be focusing on Y. It's really how are X and Y connected? How is there one social system at the bottom of all this that is the ultimate driver who are your best allies and who are your worst enemies uh that that's how i think about this question of uh the the second the other question too uh the the the praxis. And one thing about individualism and consumerism, and I totally agree that those images have basically monopolized the imagination in the capitalist world. And they are supposedly what freedom looks like, right? Choice and the ability to maintain a high level of comfortable consumer-fueled way of living. That's the image. And what I think another crucial task is, and this is not something that I personally have done, I'm more on the mapping side of things into everybody does what they can, so to speak. But I think that the, whether it's through literary and cultural production, or a kind of utopian oriented theorizing, I think we need other images of freedom that stress how much people, not just what you have to lose by giving up fossil fueled consumption, but by how much we have to gain, fossil-fueled consumption, but by how much we have to gain, both in terms of democratic participation, and I'm a big defender of democratic planning and very much on board with Polanyi on that score, how much we have to gain in terms of the sort of quality of our social relations, the richness of the possible ways we can spend our time. And, yes, and the idea that it's too limited to think that freedom is a set of choices within, on a menu that somebody else has designed and handed to you. But it's about what Habermas would call the sort of public autonomy with the forms of collective, a democratic collective effort to design the menu and or remake the menu that now, in order for people to be excited by that, though, they have to feel that their basic livelihood and social provision needs are secure enough. And I think the argument then is that capitalism cannot do that for you. In this sense, the extremity of our present situation is, I hate to say it, but kind of our friend, so to speak. I mean, it's the only thing that could possibly cause people to be open to rather radical, out-of-the-box ideas. I'll leave it at that. We still have 10 to 15 minutes, I assume, but we have a very vivid discussion in the chat. And I would give the word to you, to both of you, but include some more questions from the chat. So I would put together some questions on social inequalities. Ivan Rykovich writes, environmentalism of the rich versus poor is a great analytic, but it awaits those who stand between two sides. Villagers trying to turn defended land into eco-bungalows or what Marxists would call petty capitalists. How do we tend to class divisions while staying faithful to an eco-populist strategy? That's one of the comments. The next one I would put together with this is from Islam Katib. I think that these phases of capitalism cannot be generalized across the global south because, for example, Palestine is still stuck between phases, the in-between resulting from occupation. It would be great if we can discuss suggestions for an anti-capitalist movement that centers indigenous dispossession across the globe. This was one. movement that centers indigenous dispossession across the globe. This was one. And the next one I would put together is Dina Araya. Thanks for such wonderful lecture. My question is, what place do we think global North and global and South youth activism play in the development of counter-hegemony. So the point is class inequality and as well as the inequality in and between global South and North. And I would like to give the word to both of you to respond. Go ahead, Nancy. Would you like to start? No, no. Okay, these are really great questions. And I actually thought that maybe Andreas was going to broach some version of Ivan's question, meaning that this is another sense in which the 1% versus the 99% is a very sociologically imprecise designation. You, Andreas, talked about the Piketty's idea of the 1% of the 1% of the 1%, but I would say from a perspective of the relatively wealthy global north, that we've got a 10% problem. That's the whole professional managerial class whose retirement funds, and they're not the only ones, even the working class people who still have retired pension funds or have a, you know, a stake in this whole financialized regime. And Yvonne talks about the idea of those who want to profit from ecotourism in the global south on a small scale, which is a little bit like uberization or something, right? Or turning your apartment into an Airbnb, which, you know, is more and more young, precarious people have to do to make a living, even in the global North. even in the global north. So, I mean, the point would be, I guess there are several points. One is that in the grand scheme of things, that might not be a terrible thing. It might be nice forms of, you know, just and sustainable society, to have touristic accommodations on a small scale that involve, you know, close connection with a family that's maintaining it, where not everything has to be mega resorts, either capitalist or socialist. Remember the big socialist mega resorts. They're not necessarily our ideal either. But I still think that if you're trying to run an eco bungalow in a place that's increasingly subject to floods, to severe pollution, to mudslides, to whatever it is, to say to people who see themselves in that way, you could do this better in a global eco-socialist regime than you can in the current regime. Maybe it might or it might not be convincing, but anyway, I'm not against it. I just want to make that clear. Anyway, I'm not against it. I just want to make that clear. On Islam's point, so I totally agree about the case of Palestine and we could probably invoke others. Not everyone is dealing in the same timeframe with the same structural problem in the same timeframe. Capitalism is notorious or famous for its particular form of combined and uneven development. One thing I've tried to do here is to, in each case, think of the name of the phases in a way that I mean to imply that I'm talking about a global system that involves core and periphery, not simply as two different side-by-side formations, but as inextricably linked so that what the state of things on one side of that line is a direct consequence of the state of things on the other and vice versa. These are two highly unequal parts of the state of things on the other and vice versa. These are two highly unequal parts of the same world system. So I spoke, for example, about liberal slash colonial capitalism. And the point is to say that the nascent industrialism, developing fossil-fueled industrialism of the core, is an engine of the environmental load displacement on the periphery. It goes with extractivism. And in speaking about the global color line, what lies behind that is the idea that there's a class compromise in the global north where capital agrees through wages to bear some of the costs of social reproduction of the working class. some of the costs of social reproduction of the working class. Granted, it's always trying to chisel it down lower and lower and states have to step in to sort of, you know, make up the slack. But that's the idea that we'll pay you wages, you'll be in a labor contract, and we'll pay for your social reproduction, just give us the surplus value, the non-necessary labor time. But that is the tip of the iceberg. That goes with a whole nother stream of value siphoned from working people in the broad sense, which has to do with this expropriation, whether we're talking about expropriated labor, expropriated land, mineral deposits, anergic, et cetera, et cetera. And that's where we're not even going to pay your wages. We're just simply going to take. What do you need to do that? You need political disempowerment. You need people who can't defend themselves. You need people who don't have states of their own, or if they do at a formal level, states that are actually incapable of protecting them. They're unable to stand up to the hegemonic grand powers and so on and so forth. So this question of who has access to state protection or put differently actionable rights, not just rights on paper, but rights that they can actually use, is completely tied up with this problem of extractivism or expropriation. And I meant, I think I went very quickly here to the space of a 45 minute lecture, but in the longer version of some of this, you can see that I'm, in speaking of liberal colonial phase, I'm trying to get, show how the exploitation piece in the North and the expropriation piece in the South are the two sort of totally intercalibrated elements of a single world system. And let me leave it at that. But that would be true for each of the of the phases financially. each of the phases financially. The state managed phase is the phase where you have the famous social democratic welfare state in the global north and the attempt to build the developmental state in the newly independent global south. I appreciate not everyone is independent at that moment. But that turns out to be a highly unequal set of state capacities, because there's still the unequal exchange through trade regimes and so on, as well as the whole history of expropriation. Maybe that also gets to Dina's question about the relation of the global North and the global South. Again, the general idea is that we have to think about this in terms of a single world system that is internally complex and creates differently experienced and differently situated impacts for different populations. And this makes the job of thinking about how you would, if you want it to be, again, schematic, how you would unite the expropriated and the exploited. That's been the huge problem in the whole history of capitalism. Some, not that it's been easy either to unite just the exploited, but to the extent that that's happened. And I'm very struck by W.E.B. Du Bois' great history of the Civil War and Reconstruction, Black Reconstruction, which opens with the striking statement that in this period in the United States, there were two labor movements which were unable to recognize themselves as such and to figure out a way to ally with one another. There was the official labor movement of the exploited, of the newly forming trade unions and political movements for the rights of free labor. And then there was abolition, which was also a labor movement. It was a labor movement for enslaved labor. And even after, that's such a powerful idea. And of course, I, with my feminist hat, have to immediately say, ah, yes, W.E.B. Du Bois, but there's also a third labor movement. And that's feminism. That's the labor of care and unwaged provision, which is not exactly expropriated in the same way. So this is another possible formula for thinking about how you can try to find ways of making connections to show that there's one sort of social system here that needs to be radically transformed. And while really recognizing that not everyone is in the same situation or in the same relation to that system. that system. Thank you very much. I have the problem that time is running and we have to come to an end. And I would like to give you both the concluding remarks and perhaps it's possible to include some thoughts about Green New Deal, because there are some questions about why the Green New Deal is not the solution or why it's not the idea to go ahead. So perhaps you both in the concluding remarks can integrate this idea. Thank you. Now I start because it's exactly the last sentence from Nancy where I wanted to continue. That's this key word that you introduced, connecting. I think a key message from your two presentations is exactly arguing against all type of single issue politics, especially the single issue environmentalism, but we can extend it to other issues. And the answer always is looking at the connections. That's a key prerequisite for all types of alliances. I think that's really very important. That's the first point. And when looking for alliances, this implies looking for commonalities. And in your presentation, there have been several suggestions. If you have this broad understanding of capitalism as a system of production, but also of reproduction, of social reproduction, of ecological reproduction, then you see that there are different single issues, but they have a lot in common. As you argue correctly that we are living in times of transformation, this implies that business as usual is not possible. I think the chance for finding new commonalities is, and I think that's what you said and that's what your co-author Rahel Yegi is also arguing that there is a huge dysfunctionality in our traditional ways of handling problems. Here I see a chance for the type of alliance that you suggest and a certain predisposition for people to engage with new alternatives. Linking the care movement in the pandemic with issues of Green New Deal and that's Brigitte now the question with the Green New Deal and degrowth and Nancy used the words that's also Polanyian illusionary because when Polanyi talks about the liberal utopia it's not that it might be a good or bad idea but it's simply illusionary. It cannot be actualized. So, when Nancy talks about certain, in the end of the presentation, about certain of quite common political projects, I would argue that many, I would say that there is some truth in the degrowth movement and there are very important elements in the degrowth movement. I think given the current correlation of forces and the strength of this right-wing reactionary movement, I think Green New Deal is an urgent and necessary short-term project for gaining majorities, but it's very correct, it's insufficient. And so one can extend this, include other struggles, other problems, but it's always, I would argue, the same type of political methodology that you respect the differences, but you aim at stressing the commonalities. And I think that's a prerequisite for all types of left hegemony that has any chance of countering this very effective supremacist right-wing hegemony. That's a really helpful comment, Andreas. I would say, I would just simply say that we have to try to think commonality differently. No longer, if it ever did, meaning sameness. meaning sameness. You know, I mean, the last thing you want is some kind of, let's say, hegemonization that unifies, that designates one situation as the sort of the core of the revolutionary subject, and then everyone else has to somehow fall behind, you know, in line with it. So the commonality is not so much at the level of sharing immediate problems, or, I mean, everyone somehow has to find their own way into a perspective. And that's why I think, you know, that's why I sort of saved the word socialism for the very end. And why I said anti-capitalism is kind of the thing, in a sense. There's nothing like a shared enemy without you saying, but we're all exactly the same social. I'm a socialist. And I even not a couple of years ago, tried to write something about what socialism should mean in the 21st century in the socialist register. It's a very preliminary and inadequate idea. And it's something I want to think more about. But I think this commonality thing really has to be very roomy somehow, very capacious. The only other thing on Green New Deal, The only other thing on Green New Deal. So in the U.S., there's there's more than one version of the Green New Deal, you know, and so you have the Democratic Socialists of America, DSA, which is AOC's party, you know, has a version which is explicitly conceived as a kind of transitional socialist program. And then you have more mainstream versions that are not conceived that way. So I think part of what is going to play out to the degree this goes anywhere at all is a struggle over which version of the Green New Deal. struggle over which version of the Green New Deal. And there, I would say that the trick is, first of all, how to avoid the problem of the old New Deal, right? Which is you build a national regime that is progressive. This has to do with what Andrea said about finding the right context. Is the context the nation or is the context the globe? Well, with anything ecological, it can't be anything but the globe, despite the fact that the planetary crisis manifests differently here and there and so on and so forth. So there's going to be a big problem with Green New Deal about how it is self-consciously designed and implemented in ways that open to the international in ways that open to the international instead of the usual thing of we're going to siphon the wealth from you to pay for making a good deal for us. So that's tricky. That's very, very tricky. We'll see. But I believe, as I said at one point, I think we have at least sort of three versions of eco-politics that I think have real potential. And that's what I call environmental degrowth or decoloniality, put those two together, and Green New Deal. Those are the sort of most promising, at least in terms of large categories. And you can imagine an aversion of each of them that will be problematic. So the question is sort of, I tried to indicate that very, the Green New Deal easily becomes a lopsided class compromise within a single country. Environmental justice, it just becomes, well, let's put some toxic waste dumps in white neighborhoods too, sort of share the, the toxicity and, you know, de-growth, I said this yesterday, needs to think harder about what should grow because there are things that do need to grow and what should not grow. One thing I'm very clear on is and what should not grow. One thing I'm very clear on is that what should not grow is capital. And that's the thing that capitalism wants to grow. So, and, you know, it also can in some versions suggest, and this is the appeal of the right-wing populism, that we want to take your car away from you. We want to take this away from you. And this is really, each of these things has its problems. But I think that there are ways that each of them could develop best case scenario that would be part of and make a real contribution to the what the counter hegemonic block that I'm envisioning, but I don't think either any of them in its present form is is actually it the it that we're looking for. Thank you very much, both to you for this fascinating talk and for this inspiring comment. And thank you very much to all of you.